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Filing of an SR-21 Form
In recent years a large majority1 of state legislatures have
enacted Motor Vehicle Safety and Financial Responsibility Laws.2
In general, this legislation requires both the owner and operator of
a vehicle involved in an accident, where the property damage is
over $100 or where there is a personal injury, to file some type of
security with the commissioner of insurance. If the operator or
owner has automobile liability insurance, the insurer is required to
file a notice of the coverage with the commissioner. If the insurer
does not file this form, known as an SR-21, within a specified time,
both the operator's license and the owner's registration are revoked.
The specific problem here is whether the insurer who files
such a notice admitting coverage as to a certain accident, becomes
liable on such policy even though it would not have been liable
had it not filed the form. In nearly all automobile liability policies
there is a clause limiting coverage to the named insured and anyone
who has his permission to drive the vehicle.3 In Prisuda v. General
Casualty Company,4 the plaintiff was injured by an automobile
owned by the insured but driven by a boy who did not have the
permission of the owner.5 The defendant insurer mistakenly filed
1 All states have passed some type of Safety Responsibility Law and 41
of them are substantially like those of Wisconsin, Iowa and Nebraska,
which are discussed herein.
2 Since these acts have been in effect the number of uncompensated
injuries has gone down along with the number of uninsured motorists. See
Aberg, Effect of, and Problems Arising from Financial Responsibility Laws,
A.B.A., Proc. Ins. Law, §§ 45, 47 (1944).
3 A typical example of an exclusion or limitation clause in an automobile
liability policy of an authorized Nebraska insurance carrier; "Definition of
Insured: (a) With respect to the insurance for bodily injury liability and
for property damage liability the unqualified word 'insured' includes the
named insured and, if the named insured is an individual, his spouse
if a resident of the same household, and also includes any person while
using the automobile and any person or organization legally responsible for
the use thereof, provided the actual use of the automobile is by the named
insured of such spouse or with the permission of either."
4 1 Wis. 2d 166, 83 N. W. 2d 739 (1927). This is the principle case and is
hereinafter referred to as the Prisuda opinion.
5 Prisuda v. General Casualty Co., 272 Wis. 41, 74 N. W. 2d 777 (1956).
This case decided only the coverage issue.
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an SR-21 as a notice of coverage for both the operator and the
owner. It believed the operator had the permission of the owner,
and filed in compliance with the Wisconsin Statute: 6
Upon receipt of notice of such accident, the insurance company
which issued such policy or bond shall furnish for filing with the
commissioner a written notice that such policy or bond was in effect
at the time of such accident.
After discovering its mistake, the insurer sought to recover the
SR-21 but the commissioner of insurance denied their request.
Held, the insurer is liable because it filed the SR-21 even though
it might not have been liable had it failed to file.7 The Prisuda
case is based primarily on previous Wisconsin cases. Laughnan v.
Griffiths8 was the first and was followed in less than two years by
Behringer v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Company.9 These
cases, on facts similar to those in Prisuda,10 decided that the filing
of an SR-21 precludes the insurance carrier from denying the state-
ments made on the form.
These Wisconsin decisions represent the only body of cases in
the United States dealing with the effect of an erroneous filing of
an SR-21. The effect of these decisions is most certain to cause
insurance carriers to be more prudent when investigating accidents
and therefore the cases do implement public policy. These cases
will undoubtedly be referred to should this'problem arise in other
jurisdictions. It is most important, then, that they form a sound
basis for a rather uniform law.
6 Wis. Stat. Ann. § 85.09 (5) (d) (Reissue 1957).
7 May the insurance company recover in a subsequent action against the
operator? Would the doctrine of unjust enrichment apply? Would the
Prisuda case be stare decisis for such a suit? These questions all remain
unanswered following the Prisuda opinion. To allow the insurance carrier
recovery, would be to put the burden on the true wrongdoer. Such a result
would still allow the injured party full compensation and also grant the
company an opportunity for indemnification. Such quasi-contractual relief
might be allowed under the doctrine of unjust enrichment. See Restatement,
Restitution § 1. It must be remembered that the purpose of the Safety
Responsibility Act is to compensate the injured, (See Laughnan v. Griffiths,
271 Wis. 247, 73 N. W. 2d 587 (1955)), and not to punish those who make
mistakes while attempting to conform to the statute. The negligent operator
is the true wrongdoer.
8 271 Wis. 247, 73 N. W. 2d 587 (1955).
9 275 Wis. 586, 82 N. W. 2d 915 (1957).
10 1 Wis. 2d 166, 83 N. W. 2d 739 (1957).
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I. PROBLEMS OF INTERPRETATION
A.
Although the court, in the Prisuda case, said reliance was not a
material issue and thereby destroyed the possibility of estoppel,
this doctrine should be discussed in regard to the present problem.
The court was justified in disallowing reliance on the part of the
plaintiff. In the Behringer case" the court spoke on the purpose
of filing an SR-21 and said:
... the SR-21 is filed to protect such named insured as owner
of the insured vehicle, against having his vehicle registration sus-
pended.
The same purpose applies to the preservation of the operator's
license. If there is any reliance it is only on the part of the State.
But this does not mean that there is reliance on the part of the
injured party who is suing for damages. The injured party cannot
make use of the estoppel between the State and the insurance
carrier. Even if he went to the office of the commissioner and
looked at the SR-21 he could not plead estoppel. At the time of
the accident he had a cause of action for damages and after looking
at the form this cause of action is unchanged. Estoppel requires a
justifiable reliance and a change of position due to the reliance.12
The requirements are not met in this situation.
B.
The Prisuda opinion mentions but one statute, section 85.09
(5) (d)13 but this section, as well as the rest of the act, does not
contain an express provision of the consequences of filing an SR-21.
Section 85.09 (5) (b) (3) ,'14 although not cited by the court, is
susceptible of an interpretation that would justify the Prisuda de-
cision. Subsection (3)15 states that the security clause shall not
apply:
To such operator or owner if the liability of such operator or
owner for damages resulting from such accident is, in the judgment
of the commissioner, covered by any other form of liability insur-
ance policy or bond.
The court may be seeking to implement this section. The filing of
11275 Wis. 586, 82 N. W. 2d 915, 919 (1957).
12 Coursey v. International Harvester Co., 109 F. 2d 774 (10th Cir. 1940);
G. Amsinck & Co. v. Springfield Grocer Co., 7 F. 2d 855 (8th Cir. 1925).




the SR-21, as notice of coverage of the operator, could be construed
as "any other form of liability insurance," in the judgment of the
commissioner. It is also arguable that the SR-21 is a type of bond
guaranteeing the payment of any possible damages. The use of
the word "judgment" in this section implies the insurer might be
able to file a reservation of rights and let the commissioner decide
the coverage issue. No express provision for reservations is found
in the statutes and such reservations have not been accepted in
Wisconsin, 6 but it would seem that if the insurer had provided the
commissioner with all the facts it could not be estopped from
asserting its regular policy defenses.
C.
It is clear that the legislature has been silent as to the effect
on the insurance contract of the filing of an SR-21 as notice of
coverage. In a similar case where an SR-21 was involved, the
United States District Court 17 states that the silence of the legis-
lature is significant and that it would appear that there was no
intent to make the filing change the contract rights of any party.
The Safety Responsibility Statute of Iowa' where this case took
place is almost identical to the Wisconsin Statute.19 Thus the
United States District Court and the Wisconsin Supreme Court
have answered the question in disagreement. The opinion advanced
by the District Court seems to be a correct one.
The Wisconsin decision 0 implies that the effect of filing an
SR-21 is to guarantee payment of damages by the insurer. But the
word "guarantee" is not used in the Statute.21 The Wisconsin court
16 The Wisconsin Commissioner of Motor Vehicles has generally made it
a policy to refuse to accept any type of conditions or reservations that
may accompany an SR-21. The statutes of Wisconsin and Nebraska do not
set up a standard for the withdrawal of a previously filed SR-21. Therefore
the respective Commissioners dictate the rules for withdrawal. The Wis-
consin Commissioner will not return an SR-21 while the present Nebraska
Commissioner of Financial Responsibility will do so if a valid reason is
offered. Mistake is recognized as a valid reason for withdrawal of an
SR-21. Interview with Maurice M. Jacobsen, Supervisor of Financial Re-
sponsibility in Nebraska.
17 Hoosier Gas Co. v. Fox, 102 F. Supp. 214, 229 (D. C. Iowa 1952).
18 Iowa Code Ann. §§ 321A.4 to 321A.11.
19 Wis. Stat. Ann. § 85.09 inclusive (Reissue 1957).
20 1 Wis. 2d 166, 83 N. W. 2d 739 (1957).
2'lWis. Stat. Ann. § 85.09; and see Pulvermacher v. Sharp, 275 Wis. 371,
82 N. W. 2d 163 (1957) for a discussion of the "guarantee" theory. This
case, although distinguished by the court, seems inconsistent with the
Laughnan and Prisuda cases.
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may have reasoned that such filing is proof of security, but proof
of security is provided for in a separate section of the statutes.22
Proof of security is required before a driver or an owner can
operate a car under Financial Responsibility legislation, whereas
the SR-21 form is a feature of the Safety Responsibility law which
deals with security after an accident. There is a great difference
in these two statutes: "Security (the safety responsibility phase)
S.. is retrospective in operation. Proof of financial responsibility
* . . is prospective in operation .... -23
The District Court is not alone in its interpretation. The Wis-
consin Attorney General, 24 in an opinion requested by the Com-
missioner of Insurance, suggested that the filing of a notice of
insurance in conformity with the Safety Responsibility law does
not result in absolute coverage. The provision that the filing of
notice of insurance in conformity with the Safety Responsibility
section does acknowledge that a policy of insurance was in effect
at the time of the accident but it does not preclude the insurer from
relying on its policy defenses. The Attorney General also states
that an attempt on the part of the Motor Vehicle Commissioner to
imply from such filing absolute coverage would be to deny to the
insurer the benefit of certain sections of the Wisconsin Statutes




The interpretation of the Safety Responsibility Law used by
the Wisconsin court results in a windfall to the plaintiff. Without
this holding, the plaintiff has only a cause of action against the
driver of the vehicle which caused his injuries. Now the plaintiff
has an election; if the defendant driver is unable to respond in
damages, the plaintiff has the opportunity to recover from the in-
surance company which would be financially able to meet the
judgment.
E.
The defendant operator also receives a windfall. Without pay-
ing the usual insurance premiums, the operator is awarded a liabil-
ity policy by the court that insures him in this particular accident.
But, there is no contractual relationship between the operator and
22Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 85.09 (17) to (30) (Reissue 1957).
23 Hoosier Gas Co. v. Fox, 102 F. Supp. 214, 229 (D. C. Iowa 1952).
24 35 Opin. Atty. Gen. 210 (1946) Wisconsin.
25 Wis. Stat. Ann. § 205.30.
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the insurer. The court actually creates a contract for the parties.
But the very terms of the policy exclude this coverage and the
insurer should not even be made a party to the suit for damages.
The legal dispute is between the injured party and the operator,
who, as a matter of fact, is uninsured. The proposition that insur-
ance contracts cannot be created in this manner has been upheld
by the Wisconsin Supreme Court.26 This same proposition is the
basis for the dissent of Justice Gehl, joined by Justice Steinle, in
Laughnan v. Griffiths.27 It is submitted that the dissent is well
taken and should be the law in the absence of statute expressly to
the contrary.
By precluding the insurer from denying the statements made on
the SR-21, the court defeats the intent of the parties. The insured
owner knows the limitations of her insurance policy. She knew
that she could not include the operator under the policy unless she
gave her permission, yet she chose not to do this. It was found in
the Prisuda case 28 that the operator did not have even the implied
permission of the owner to drive the automobile. It appears that
the court is aiding the operator where the owner chose not to do so.
II. A POSSIBLE SOLUTION
The Wisconsin legislature has seen the problem and has at-
tempted to remedy the situation by introducing and passing Bill
116s, 29 which revises the old system under the Safety Responsibility
Law and wisely does away with the SR-21 form. This bill repeals
and recreates the sections of the Wisconsin statutes discussed herein.
The new law3 0 provides that after receipt of a report of an accident,
which is to contain a statement relating to the insurance in effect at
the time of the accident, the commissioner shall send to the insur-
ance company that part of the report which pertains to an auto-
mobile liability policy or bond. The insurance company has 30
days in which to notify the commissioner of the correctness of the
statement of insurance contained in the report. The company may
notify the commissioner that the policy covered the operator only,
the owner only, or was not in effect as to either of them. The com-
missioner shall asume the policy was in effect as to both owner and
26 Maryland Casualty Co. v. Industrial Comm., 230 Wis. 363, 284 N.W. 36
(1939); Macomber v. Minn. F & M Ins. Co., 187 Wis. 432, 204 N. W. 331
(1925).
27 271 Wis. 247, 73 N. W. 2d 587 (1955).
2 8 Prisuda v. General Casualty Co., 272 Wis. 41, 74 N. W. 2d 777 (1956).
29 Wis. Session Laws (1957), c. 545.
30 Ibid.
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
operator unless he receives a notice to the contrary from the in-
surance company. The company may correct the report only
within 30 days and only if it files an affidavit signed by the owner
stating that the operator did not have the required permission to
operate the vehicle. Where the insurance company has failed to
notify and this failure was caused by fraud, the company has 30
days after the discovering of the fraud in which to notify the com-
missioner of the correction. There is a further provision that
nothing in this bill shall impose any obligation not assumed by the
company in its policy, except where no correction is made within
30 days, or unless fraud is involved. The failure to correct estops
the insurance company from using its policy defenses such as failure
to give permission, purpose of use, or use beyond certain limits.
The new law is clearer but this does not mean it is entirely
fair and correct. The insurance company is still without the bene-
fit of a court decision as to coverage and cannot change the report
after 30 days even if a court should, in the meantime, find there
was no coverage.
It is obvious that the legislature was prompted toward this
enactment because of the recent Wisconsin Supreme Court cases.31
In all but one of the other states the question has not arisen.32 This
does not mean that the deficiency in the various Safety Responsi-
bility Laws will never be a problem. More and more SR-21s are
being filed33 and more than likely other states will some day see
the gap in this legislation and try to fill it like the Wisconsin legis-
lature has done. The law is now fairly clear in Wisconsin and the
insurance companies are confronted by legislation that, although
it may not be for their benefit, sets up a certain procedure that
warns them that they may be estopped from asserting their policy
defenses under certain situations.
III. APPLICATION TO NEBRASKA
The next question that arises in the minds of Nebraska insur-
ance companies and their attorneys is: What would and should
happen if this problem arose in our state? The Nebraska and Wis-
31Laughnan v. Griffiths, 271 Wis. 247, 73 N. W. 2d 587 (1955); Behringer v.
State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 275 Wis. 586, 82 N. W. 2d 915 (1957); and
Prisuda v. General Casualty Co., 1 Wis. 2d 166, 83 N. W. 2d 739 (1957).
32 Hoosier Gas Co. v. Fox, 102 F. Supp. 214 (D. C. Iowa 1952) was an
Iowa Case.
33 In Nebraska the exact figures are not available but the Accident
Record Bureau reports that accidents and injuries are up 4 to 5 per cent
and this, along with increased number of automobile liability policies
issued, would necessitate a great many more SR-21's being filed.
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consin Safety Responsibility Laws were very similar before the
recent changes effected in Wisconsin. 34 Both the acts set up a
commissioner and call the security form an SR-21. The Nebraska
statute even has a section similar to the one in Wisconsin where
the commissioner's judgment plays such a significant part.35
There are two important differences in Wisconsin and Nebraska
laws. First, the Wisconsin statutes allow an insurance company to
be brought directly into the suit as a party defendant.30 This is
not allowed in Nebraska.37 The injured party, in these cases, would
have to sue the operator and then the insurer would be liable for
any loss incurred, subject to the terms of the insurance contract.
Second, in Wisconsin the SR-21 is allowed to be used in evidence.3
The Nebraska statute states that neither the findings of the depart-
ment nor the reports required by the statute shall be referred to,
cc *,nor be any evidence of the negligence or due care of either
party, at the trial of any action at law to recover damages.1
39 From
this statute it could be suggested that in Nebraska the SR-21 could
not be used in evidence and therefore the plaintiff could not use the
doctrine of estoppel and could not speak of the filing as an admis-
sion against interest. The only way the plaintiff could recover
would be to prove that the operator was included within the policy
coverage and the exclusions and limitations provisions of the liabil-
ity policy were not violated. It may be that this Nebraska statute
applies only in the action between the injured party and the de-
fendant in determining liability and damages.
The Wisconsin statute4 0 could form the basis for a more equit-
able proposal. The deficiency in the Wisconsin statute seems to be
in its treatment of the insurer's policy defenses. If the connis-
sioner's discretion could be expanded and the insurance carrier
allowed to file a memorandum or reservation of rights when there
34 Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 60-501 to 60-569 (Reissue 1952); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 85.09.
35 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-508 (Reissue 1952).
36 Wis. Stat. Ann. § 260.11 (Reissue 1957).
37 It is generally recognized that the liability of an insurer and an insured
is contract and tort respectively and therefore statutory permission is
required to sustain their joinder. Smith Stage Co. v. Eckert, 21 Ariz. 28,
184 Pac. 1001 (1919), 7 A.L.R. 995 (1920). Nebraska has no such provision
and the usual no-action provision in liability policies will prevail. See 22
Marq. L. Rev. 75 (1938) for further discussion on this question.
3sWis. Stat. Ann. § 85.09 (11) (Reissue 1957).
39 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-515 (Reissue 1952).
40 Wis. Session Laws (1957), c. 545.
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is a question as to coverage, the same result would be accomplished
with a minimum of hardship on either party. The commissioner
would decide the coverage issue and the company would have a
specified period of time in which to appeal through regular judi-
cial channels or they would then be estopped from asserting their
policy defenses.
If these proposals were incorporated in a new statute the pub-
lic policy would be served in the same manner but the insurance
company would have the opportunity of a court decision as to
coverage. It is true that many companies would file a reservation
but claims without basis would quickly be decided and the coverage
problem, if very questionable, usually would come up in the ju-
dicial system, without such a statute.
Under any statute the consequences of filing an SR-21 should
be set out in a clear and equitable manner. The increased usage
of these forms points to the fact that this problem may soon be-
come very serious in Nebraska.
Donald R. Wilson, '60
